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Abstract

We explore the effect of e-cigarette taxes enacted through 2017 in eight states and two large
counties on e-cigarette prices, e-cigarette sales, and sales of other tobacco products. We use the
Nielsen Retail Scanner data for the years 2011 to 2017, comprising approximately 35,000 retailers
nationally. We calculate a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of 0.251 for retail-based purchases of ecigarettes, indicating high market concentration. We estimate a tax-to-price pass-through of 1.55
(p<0.01) and an e-cigarette own-price elasticity of -2.6 (p<0.01) for the average e-cigarette tax.
We also estimate a positive cross-price elasticity of demand for e-cigarettes and traditional
cigarettes of roughly 1.1 for the average tax, suggesting that e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes
are economic substitutes. Our results suggest that higher e-cigarette taxes would increase ecigarette prices and reduce e-cigarette sales, with an unintended effect of increasing traditional
cigarette sales. We simulate that for every one standard e-cigarette pod (a device that contains
liquid nicotine in e-cigarettes) of 0.7 ml no longer purchased as a result of an e-cigarette tax, the
same tax increases traditional cigarettes purchased by 6.2 extra packs.
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1. Introduction
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nearly 3% of adults
in the United States used electronic cigarettes (‘e-cigarettes’) in 2017 (Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention 2018). Use of e-cigarettes (‘vaping’) among adolescents has grown even more
rapidly, with nearly 27.5% of high school students using e-cigarettes in 2019 (U.S. Food & Drug
Administration 2019). The rapid rise in vaping has led to concerns among public health officials
and a focus on tobacco control policies aimed at curbing e-cigarette use. As of June 15, 2019, 15
states had enacted an e-cigarette tax (Public Health Law Center 2019). Despite the rapid increase
in e-cigarette use, very little is known about the effects of these policies on the use of e-cigarettes
or other tobacco products.
In this paper, we provide evidence of the effects of e-cigarette taxes on the prices and sales
of e-cigarettes and other tobacco products using the Nielsen Retail Scanner Data (NRSD) over the
years 2011 to 2017. The NRSD tracks weekly sales of a national panel of approximately 35,000
retailers and covers a large percentage of total sales among drug stores, mass merchandisers, food
stores, dollar stores, and club stores. 1
We identify purchases and sales of e-cigarettes and other tobacco products in the NRSD,
and we match 93.5% of e-cigarette product sales to detailed product characteristics, including
product type, liquid volume, and nicotine content. These additional characteristics allow for a
detailed investigation of the impacts of taxation on ingredient consumption as well as a more

We use the NRSD instead of the Nielsen Consumer Panel Data because the NRSD provides approximately a 4.8%
sample of national e-cigarette sales, whereas the Nielsen Consumer Panel data covers only a 0.05% sample of ecigarette sales (Allcott and Rafkin 2019).
1

1

accurate standardization of the e-cigarette taxes themselves, which are often levied based on the
quantity of liquid or nicotine contained in the products.
We first estimate the pass-through of e-cigarette and traditional cigarette taxes to the prices
of these goods, finding that e-cigarette taxes are more than fully passed through to e-cigarette
prices. We then estimate how sales of e-cigarettes and other tobacco products respond to changes
in e-cigarette taxes. We find that the demand for e-cigarettes is elastic, with an estimated price
elasticity of demand of -2.6. We also estimate that traditional cigarette sales increase following a
rise in e-cigarette taxes, suggesting that e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes are economic
substitutes with a cross-price elasticity of demand of 1.1. We estimate a price-elasticity of demand
for traditional cigarettes of -0.6, which is in line with previous estimates (for reviews, see
Chaloupka & Warner 2000, and DeCicca et al. 2018).
This study addresses many limitations in the literature examining the market for ecigarettes. First, our paper is among the first to estimate the pass-through rate for e-cigarette taxes.
In part, this dearth in the literature is due to the fact that examination of the intensive margin
requires standardizing different forms of e-cigarette taxes to measure the magnitude of the tax.
This standardization is complicated give the heterogeneous ways in which localities have elected
to tax e-cigarettes. Many e-cigarette taxes are not levied per-unit as are traditional cigarette taxes,
but rather are ad valorem taxes or excise taxes levied on the liquid amount of each e-cigarette
product. The resulting difficulty in measurement has led the few papers that examine the effects
of e-cigarette taxes to focus primarily on the extensive margin of the presence of a tax, rather than
try to estimate the effect of changes/differences in taxes on the intensive margin of taxation (e.g.
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Abouk et al. 2019). 2 Exploration of the intensive taxation margin is an important limitation of
previous work, as the standardized magnitudes of existing e-cigarette taxes vary widely, from
$0.05 per milliliter (ml) of nicotine in Kansas and Louisiana to $1.85 per ml in Minnesota. Since
the smaller tax rates (generally from excise taxes) are much closer to zero than to the larger tax
rates (generally from ad valorem taxes), combining the taxes in a single indicator (tax vs. no tax)
creates an issue akin to treatment misclassification and could lead researchers to underestimate the
potential impacts of higher levels of taxation.
To estimate the pass-through of e-cigarette taxes to prices and estimate a price elasticity of
demand, we match e-cigarette Universal Product Codes (UPCs) in the NRSD to the product type,
volume of liquid, and nicotine content of these e-cigarettes using internet searches,
correspondences with companies, and visits to retailers. Although the database of characteristics
was developed by Cotti et al. (2018), we are the first study to use it to study the effects of any ecigarette-related policies. These additional product characteristics allow us to move beyond simply
measuring the presence of an e-cigarette tax and instead incorporate the magnitude of the ecigarette tax. Thus, we are among the first research groups in the economics literature to estimate
the dollar-to-dollar pass-through rate of e-cigarette taxes to e-cigarette prices and the price
elasticity of demand for e-cigarettes.
Using the NRSD allows us to examine e-cigarette purchases much earlier than is possible
with other datasets of adults, which is another contribution of our paper. In particular, we track ecigarette purchases beginning in 2011 in the NRSD, while adult survey datasets did not begin
asking about e-cigarette use until several years later (e.g., 2016 in the Behavioral Risk Factor

In binary specifications, localities with excise and ad valorem taxes are treated the same, even though the typical
excise tax is so small that those localities are effectively much closer to the comparison group of non-tax adopting
localities than to the ad valorem tax group.
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Surveillance Survey and 2014 in the National Health Interview Survey). Use of this early time
period enables us to leverage additional policy variation and a more rigorous investigation of pretreatment trends between localities that adopted and did not adopt an e-cigarette tax.
Finally, we provide the first estimate of e-cigarette market concentration available in the
literature by calculating a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for the e-cigarette retail-based market. We
find a high degree of market concentration, which is in line with over-shifted taxes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and a review
of the literature surrounding e-cigarette use, Section 3 summarizes our data sources, Section 4
describes our methodology, Section 5 reviews the results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review and Background
In a perfectly competitive market, the rate at which a tax change impacts the after-tax
price (i.e., the ‘pass-through’) is a function of the elasticities of both supply and demand and
ranges from zero and one. The pass-through will be zero if consumers have perfectly elastic
demand (suggesting that suppliers pay the full incidence of the tax) or one if consumers have
perfectly inelastic demand (consumers pay all of the tax). However, over-shifting – when the
pass-through is greater than one – is possible in imperfectly competitive markets (e.g. Stern
1987, Besley 1989, Hamilton 1999) and has been observed in the traditional cigarette market.
For example, one study uses American Chamber of Commerce Research Association data and
differences-in-differences (DD) modeling to examine the effect of sales taxes on after-tax prices
of 12 common consumer products. The authors find negative pass-through estimates for two of
12 products, pass-through estimates between zero and one for five of 12 products, and passthrough estimates of >1 for five of 12 products. Bread has the highest pass-through of 2.42
(Besley and Rosen 1999).

4

Several recent studies use national-level data and DD modeling to evaluate the effect of
traditional cigarette tax increases on traditional cigarette prices. Lillard and Sfekas (2013) use
state-level prices from the Tax Burden on Tobacco from 1995 to 2007 and estimate a passthrough of 1.03 when including state and year fixed effects. DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu (2013)
use consumer-reported prices from the 2003 and 2006 to 2007 Current Population Survey
Tobacco Use Supplements (TUS) to estimate the pass-through of excise taxes to consumer prices
ranging from 0.91 to 1.18, with some evidence that pass-through is lower for higher intensity
smokers. Rozema and Ziebarth (2017) use individual-level data on prices paid for traditional
cigarettes from 2001 to 2012 in a sample of low-income, food stamp eligible households and
estimate a pass-through of 0.80. Hanson and Sullivan (2009) use micro-level data on traditional
cigarette prices from retail locations in Wisconsin and border states to evaluate the effects of
large increases in traditional cigarette taxes, estimating a pass-through between 1.08 and 1.17.
Finally, Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2012) use Nielsen Homescan data for 2006 and 2007
to estimate a UPC-level traditional cigarette tax pass-through of 0.85. The authors use a UPClevel rather than a state-level model to hold product quality constant. Overall, their findings
provide a series of pass-through estimates ranging from 0.80 to 1.18 when studying traditional
cigarette taxes.
Researchers have also estimated pass-through rates for other ‘sin goods:’ alcohol and
sugar-sweetened beverages. At least two studies find that alcohol taxes are more than fully
passed through to prices (Kenkel 2005, Shrestha and Markowitz 2016). Recently, Cawley et al.
(2019) reviewed 15 studies on pass-through for sugar-sweetened beverages, concluding that
trends in prices after nationwide tax implementations are in line with the hypothesis that prices
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rise by the full amount of the tax; however, local taxes generally have lower estimated passthrough, potentially due to tax evasion opportunities created by cross-border shopping.
Relatedly, a growing literature examines the relationship between e-cigarettes and
traditional cigarettes. Because variation in e-cigarette policies, particularly e-cigarette taxes, is
recent and data on e-cigarettes have not been readily available, much of the research to date on
the relationship between e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes has examined the effects of ecigarette restrictions (rather than taxes) on the demand for traditional cigarettes (rather than ecigarettes). For example, Friedman (2015) uses the National Survey on Drug Use and Health and
finds that states implementing restrictions on youth access to e-cigarette products see increases in
youth smoking rates as measured by traditional cigarette smoking in the past 30 days, suggesting
that e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes are substitutes among adolescents. Similarly, Pesko,
Hughes, and Faisal (2016) and Dave, Feng, and Pesko (2019) use the Youth Risk Behavior
Surveillance System data and restrictions on youth access to e-cigarettes, finding evidence that
the two products are substitutes for this population. Pesko and Currie (2019) have comparable
findings for pregnant adolescents using birth record data. Contrary to these findings, Abouk and
Adams (2017) use the same restrictions on youth access to e-cigarettes and individual-level data
for underage high school seniors from Monitoring the Future Survey (MTF) to find that the
products are economic complements. Finally, Dave et al. (2019) finds that exposure to ecigarette advertising helps adult smokers quit smoking.
Few studies estimate the effect of tobacco control policies on e-cigarette use itself. One
exception is Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2018). The authors examine the effects of traditional
cigarette taxes and other tobacco control policies, including indoor vaping restrictions (IVRs)
and indoor smoking restrictions (ISRs), on adult households’ purchases of e-cigarettes and other

6

tobacco products using the Nielsen Consumer Panel data. The authors document that traditional
cigarette tax increases induce households to purchase fewer e-cigarette products, suggesting a
complementary relationship between e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes. Both Abouk and
Adams (2017) and Dave, Feng, and Pesko (2019) provide evidence from a single wave of data
that age purchasing restrictions reduce e-cigarette use.
Recently, however, increasingly available data and the presence of new e-cigarette
policies have led to additional examinations of e-cigarette tax effects. One working paper finds
that e-cigarette tax adoption leads to a 6.3% increase in prenatal smoking (Abouk et al. 2019), a
second study provides some evidence that the e-cigarette tax increase in Minnesota in 2013
reduces e-cigarette use and increases traditional cigarette use among teenagers (Pesko and
Warman 2019), and a third study documents that e-cigarette tax adoption reduces current vaping
by 13.9% among adult men (Pesko, Courtemanche, and Maclean 2019). The final study also
documents that traditional cigarette taxes increase e-cigarette use. One limitation of these studies
is that they use the presence of a tax (i.e., extensive margin) rather than the magnitude (i.e.,
intensive margin) of the tax as in the current paper. Additionally, these studies do not use as long
a time period or as much policy variation as we use in our work.
A new working paper by Saffer et al. (2019) also uses survey data, the TUS from 1992 to
2015, in conjunction with e-cigarette taxes in Minnesota (which increased from 35% to 95% in
2013) and synthetic control methods to assess how e-cigarette taxes impact adult smokers in a case
study analysis. Estimates suggest that the e-cigarette tax rate increases adult smoking and reduces
smoking cessation in Minnesota, relative to the synthetic control group, and imply a cross elasticity
of current smoking participation with respect to e-cigarette prices of 0.13. Assuming a retailer
markup of 33% over the wholesale costs, the authors estimate a tax-pass-through to price in
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Minnesota of 1.33. Relative to this paper, we utilize substantially more policy variation, as we
leverage the experiences of all e-cigarette tax adopting localities to date rather than a single state,
and explore outcomes beyond traditional cigarette smoking.
Other studies estimate the effect of e-cigarette prices, rather than taxes, on e-cigarette
demand. The NRSD is used in two studies to study the effect of e-cigarette prices on e-cigarette
and traditional cigarette sales. Huang et al. (2018) use data from 2007 to 2014 to document ecigarette own-price elasticities for rechargeable e-cigarette sales of –1.4 and for disposable ecigarette sales of –1.6. Using data over the period 2009 to 2013 Zheng et al. (2017) estimate an
e-cigarette own-price elasticity of demand of –2.1, a cross-price elasticity of traditional cigarette
prices on e-cigarettes sales of 1.9, and a cross-price elasticity of e-cigarette prices on traditional
cigarette sales of 0.004. Using European data over the period 2011 to 2014, Stoklosa, Drope, and
Chaloupka (2016) document an e-cigarette own-price elasticity of demand of –0.8 and a crossprice elasticity of traditional cigarette prices on e-cigarette sales of 4.6. Pesko et al. (2016), using
a discrete choice experiment, estimate e-cigarette own-price elasticity among current adult
smokers of 1.8.
Survey data are used in four studies to estimate the effect of e-cigarette prices on e-cigarette
use rather than sales. Saffer et al. (2018) use data on adults from the 2014 to 2015 TUS to estimate
an e-cigarette price elasticity of vaping participation of –1.2. Pesko et al. (2018) use two years of
the MTF data on middle and high school students and find a –1.8 own price elasticity of days
vaping. Finally, Cantrell et al. (2019) use national longitudinal cohort data on a sample of 15- to
21-year-olds from 2014 to 2016 and find no effect of e-cigarette prices on vaping, but a traditional
cigarette cross-price elasticity of 0.9. Of course, the endogeneity of prices is an obvious potential
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limitation of these papers, and we aim to overcome this challenge by using plausibly exogenous
variation from the implementation of taxes.
Lastly, a new working paper, Allcott and Rafkin (2019), use a different identification
strategy to estimate whether e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes are economic substitutes or
complements. Using all known available survey data for the U.S., the authors use the pre-2013
smoking propensities for 800 adult demographic cells and 56 youth demographic cells to
implement a ‘shift-share’ strategy to examine what impact wide use of e-cigarettes starting in the
year 2013 had on smoking trends. Point estimates suggest that e-cigarettes cause a 4% reduction
in smoking for adults and a 24% reduction for youth.
Allcott and Rafkin’s paper was written concurrently to and independently from ours and,
while their primary objectives and ours are notably different, there is some overlap in the
contributions, such as using NRSD, standardizing e-cigarette tax sizes, examining the relationship
between e-cigarette taxes and prices, and estimating the price elasticity of e-cigarettes. However,
there are important differences in the nature of these contributions. First, their interest in the
relationship between taxes and prices is as a first stage in an instrumental variable (IV) model
estimating the price elasticity of demand for use in welfare calculation, rather than as an attempt
to measure the pass-through rate. Accordingly, Allcott and Rafkin use a logarithmic, rather than
linear, functional form for both taxes and prices, which implies that their estimate relates
percentage changes in taxes to percentage changes in prices, which is not informative about overversus under-shifting. Second, they use the 2013 to 2017 NRSD whereas we use data over the
period 2011 to 2017, allowing us to examine longer pre-treatment trends. Third, Allcott and Rafkin
standardize e-cigarette taxes as ad valorem taxes, whereas we standardize the e-cigarette taxes as
specific excise taxes by taking advantage of Washington D.C.’s ad valorem tax that is set to parity
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with the traditional cigarette tax. Finally, Allcott and Rafkin estimate the own-price elasticity of
e-cigarettes but do not examine the cross-price elasticity between e-cigarettes and traditional
cigarettes. Instead, their primary evidence for substitutability comes from the shift-share approach
described above. Our paper and theirs, therefore, complement each other in that both find evidence
that e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes are substitutes using very different approaches.
3. Data
a. Nielsen Retail Scanner Data (NRSD)
Our main data source is the NRSD between 2011 and 2017. The NRSD comprises a sample
of approximately 30,000 to 35,000 retailers, including grocery stores, drug stores, mass
merchandise retailers, and other types of stores. In 2017, the NRSD included between 15% and
26% of all food store, mass merchandiser, dollar store, and club store sales, and over 50% of drug
store sales. The NRSD contains a smaller percentage of sales in convenience stores and liquor
stores (approximately 2% each). The volume of each UPC purchased at each store is recorded
weekly, as well as the average price paid, including all taxes except sales taxes. We construct a
sales-weighted e-cigarette price at both the UPC-locality-quarter level and locality-quarter level,
where a locality is defined as a state or county (depending on the geographical location of a tax)
and a quarter refers to a quarter-by-year.
We analyze sales data on five tobacco product categories: e-cigarettes, traditional
cigarettes, cigars, chewing tobacco, and loose tobacco. Measuring e-cigarette sales in the NRSD
presents some challenges. First, e-cigarette products in the NRSD are heterogeneous. Some are
disposable e-cigarettes, while others are starter kits or refill cartridges. Further, the quantity of
cartridges, liquid, and nicotine varies widely within products of the same type. Second, many ecigarette taxes are levied in proportion to the liquid volume in each e-cigarette product, while
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others are levied as ad valorem taxes. This regulatory pattern is distinct from traditional cigarette
taxes, which are nearly all levied in terms of dollars per traditional cigarette. Finally, previous
research suggests that measuring traditional cigarette consumption only through the number of
products used provides an incomplete picture of smokers’ behavior in response to policy changes.
In particular, smokers may respond to traditional cigarette taxes by altering the type of traditional
cigarette they smoke or how they smoke the product (Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft 2016, Nesson 2017a,
b, Adda and Cornaglia 2006, Evans and Farrelly 1998). None of these behavioral responses are
captured by the number of products consumed but all are important for evaluating the overall effect
of a tax adoption. Vapers may plausibly display comparable behavioral responses to e-cigarette
policies and we wish to capture such responses.
To address these challenges, we estimate our main models of e-cigarette sales using the
liquid volume in each e-cigarette, as in Cotti et al. (2018). We match UPCs in the NRSD to three
additional product characteristics using correspondences with e-cigarette companies, internet
searches, and in-person visits to retailers conducted by members of the research team. We first
record the type of e-cigarette product for each UPC, classifying products into disposable ecigarettes, starter kits, and cartridge refills. 3 Second, we calculate the milliliters (mls) of fluid in
each e-cigarette UPC and the amount of nicotine in milligrams for each UPC. 4 We are able to
match 93.5% of the e-cigarette products by the value of sales in the NRSD to tobacco product
characteristics in this way.

3

Starter kits include a reusable battery and atomizer along with a selection of disposable cartridges.
There are no regulations for labeling nicotine in e-cigarettes. While nearly all the products we identified label the
nicotine content of their e-cigarettes, some brands directly label the nicotine content in milligrams while others label
the nicotine content as a percent of the total liquid volume. Hence, for products where nicotine content is only
provided as a concentration of nicotine by liquid volume, we convert from liquid volume to milligrams as nicotine
by using the following calculation: (mg)= (%nicotine)*(10)*(liquid volume in ml).
4
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For the other tobacco products, we create variables counting the sales for each product in
terms of the units provided by Nielsen. We thus count the number of traditional cigarettes sold,
which we aggregate into packs, the number of cigars, and the ounces of chewing tobacco and loose
tobacco sold.
b. Tobacco Control Policies
We use three policy data sources to construct our e-cigarette tax variable. State-level ecigarette tax data is drawn from the Public Health Law Center (Public Health Law Center 2019)
and the CDC State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2019b). We reconcile discrepancies by directly consulting the
original statutes. We collect sub-state e-cigarette tax data from the Vapor Products Tax website
(Tax Data Center 2019). To date, e-cigarette taxes are primarily levied through an excise tax on
per ml liquid volume or through an ad valorem tax that is paid by the wholesaler or retailer. In our
sample period, Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, West Virginia, Cook County, and Chicago levy
an excise tax on liquid volume. California, Minnesota, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and
Washington DC use an ad valorem tax. Chicago uses an excise tax on both liquid volume and the
number of disposable or refill units sold. Several Alaskan counties also levy e-cigarette taxes, but
Alaska is not included in the NRSD and is therefore not included in our standardization procedure.
Appendix Table 1 provides information on the effective dates, unit taxed, tax amount, and relative
tax value for each e-cigarette tax law implemented during the time frame of NRSD data utilized
in this study.
Washington DC’s tax is unique in that it set its ad valorem tax rate to match 100% of the
traditional cigarette excise tax, suggesting that each one percentage point of ad valorem tax is 4.3
cents. We use this relationship to convert e-cigarette ad valorem taxes into excise tax equivalents
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for each relevant locality. Please see the appendix for a discussion of our conversion. We convert
all e-cigarette taxes to 2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index-Urban Consumers [CPI].
Between the end of our study period (end of 2017) and June 15, 2019, eight additional
states enacted new e-cigarette laws: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Vermont, and Washington (Public Health Law Center 2019). We utilize these
additional taxes when we incorporate future policies into our event study specification following
Ghimire and Maclean (2020).
We collect data on traditional cigarette excise taxes from the CDC STATE System and
transform these into the traditional cigarette excise taxes measured in real 2017 dollars (using CPI)
in each state and quarter (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2019b). Two states
(California and New Jersey) enacted Tobacco 21 laws by the end of 2017 and we include an
indicator for this policy (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 2019b). 5
Additionally, we collect data on indoor air laws from the American Non-Smokers’ Rights
Foundation (ANR). ANR tracks when municipalities, counties, and states pass indoor air laws for
vaping or smoking in different venues. We use this information to create two separate measures
for the share of the population in each county living with IVRs and ISRs for private workplaces,
restaurants, or bars. For both IVRs and ISRs, we weight laws applying to bars, restaurants, and
private workplaces equally. For ISRs, we also consider laws applying to only part of the
establishment (but not the full establishment) with ½ weight. 6
4. Methods

5

Hawaii also enacted a Tobacco 21 law before the end of 2017; however, the Nielsen data is limited to the
contiguous 48 states and so Hawaii is not included.
6
These partial laws were uncommon for IVRs.
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We implement a standard DD identification strategy that connects variation in retailers’ ecigarette prices to changes in tobacco control policies. That is, we leverage variation in localitylevel tobacco control policies that occur between 2011 and 2017 to identify treatment effects.
Specifically, we estimate:
(1)

𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽𝑊𝑊 + 𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋 + 𝜎𝜎𝑙𝑙,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑞𝑞 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ,

where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 the price for e-cigarette product (i.e., UPC Code) i in locality l and quarter t. We use
51 localities, one for each state and Washington DC (minus Alaska and Hawaii as these states are

not in the NRSD), but separating Cook County from Illinois and Montgomery County from
Maryland since these localities also adopt e-cigarette taxes during our study period. We aggregate
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 to the product-by-locality-by-quarter level by creating an average price for each UPC-localityquarter, using each UPC’s sales volume in localities that have not enacted an e-cigarette tax by

June 15, 2019 as the weight. 7 We measure both e-cigarette taxes (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ) and traditional cigarette
excise taxes (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ). 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 is a continuous variable measuring the magnitude of e-cigarette

taxes as described in Section 3.b and the online appendix. An exception to this approach is in our
event-study in which we use an indicator for any e-cigarette tax to allow testing of the parallel
trends assumption required for DD models to recover causal estimates of treatment effects. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡

is a continuous variable measuring the locality-level traditional cigarette excise tax per pack.

We include additional tobacco control policies in 𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 , a vector of ISR and IVR laws

(measured as the percent of the locality’s population living under an ISR, and separately as the
percent of the locality’s population living under an IVR). We also include locality-level
characteristics in 𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 : beer tax (dollars per gallon converted to 2017 dollar using the CPI), the

7

Non-adopting localities are used for the weights to avoid the weights being endogenously impacted by the taxes.
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Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansions, 8 the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ unemployment rate,
and Current Population Survey demographics (e.g., age, sex, and race/ethnicity). We also include
UPC-by-locality and quarter fixed effects in our regression models, represented by 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 and 𝜏𝜏𝑦𝑦 ,

respectively, following Harding et al. (2013). The product fixed effects hold product availability,
and other attributes such as quality, constant, thus allowing us to study pass-through independent

of manufacturers changing their mix of products offered for sale in response to e-cigarette taxes.
We cluster our standard errors at the locality level in all specifications (Bertrand et al., 2004), and
we weight the data by the share of e-cigarette sales in localities that do not adopt an e-cigarette tax
by 2017. We demonstrate that our main models are robust to a number of alternative specifications,
as well as different analytical samples and aggregations.
After examining the pass-through of e-cigarette taxes to e-cigarette prices, we next examine
whether e-cigarette prices and traditional cigarette prices affect sales of tobacco products. In these
models, we aggregate our data to the locality-by-quarter level for each category of tobacco
products, which is different from the product-by-locality-by-quarter aggregation in equation (1) to
permit new product offerings to affect overall sales. We examine five categories of tobacco
products: e-cigarettes, traditional cigarettes, cigars, chewing tobacco, and loose tobacco. For ecigarette products, our unit of measure is mls of liquid purchased to match our standardized tax
variable that is also per mls of e-cigarette liquid. We examine counts of the products purchased for
the other tobacco product categories. We estimate a similar model to that in equation (1), but at
the locality-by-quarter level:
(2)

𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊 + 𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋 + 𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙 + 𝜒𝜒𝑞𝑞 + 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ,

https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordablecare-act
8
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Here, 𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 represents the sales of a tobacco product in locality 𝑐𝑐 and time 𝑡𝑡, and the other variables
are the same as in equation (1). We weight equation (2) regressions using the population in that

locality and cluster our standard errors at the locality level.
We are also interested in studying the impact of prices on tobacco product purchases. An
obvious problem with estimating this relationship however is that e-cigarette and traditional
cigarette prices are endogenously determined. Therefore, we simultaneously instrument for ecigarette and traditional cigarette prices with e-cigarette and traditional cigarette taxes in a twostage least squares (IV) regression:
(3)

� 𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼 𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑊𝑊𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑊𝑊 + 𝑋𝑋𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋 + 𝛿𝛿𝑙𝑙 + 𝜒𝜒𝑞𝑞 + 𝜖𝜖𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 ,
𝑌𝑌𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸

� 𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
�𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 , from first stage
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙,𝑡𝑡 are now replaced with their predicted values, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸

regressions. Our identifying assumption in the IV model is that e-cigarette and traditional cigarette
taxes affect demand only through their effects on e-cigarette and traditional cigarette prices. Thus,
we assume that there are no other channels though which taxes can influence sales (e.g., signaling
of product risk). We acknowledge that assuming no non-price effects is a strong supposition.
5. Results
a. Summary Statistics
We begin by showing summary statistics and the variation in e-cigarette excise taxes. Table
1 shows summary statistics at the UPC-locality-quarter level. Overall, our sample has 90,730 UPClocality-quarter observations, of which 10,248 are subject to an e-cigarette tax. The average ecigarette price per ml of liquid is $4.40, and the average price is slightly higher in localities that
adopt an e-cigarette tax (measured before the tax) than in localities that did not adopt a tax by the
end of our timeframe. The conditional (non-zero) mean e-cigarette tax is $0.68 per fluid ml. The
unconditional mean is $0.044 per fluid ml. The unconditional mean is markedly lower than the
16

conditional mean as many localities do not adopt a tax during our study period, and those localities
that adopt a tax implement this policy during the latter portion of our study period. Excise taxes
are generally much smaller in magnitude than ad valorem taxes, with the conditional mean value
of excise taxes being $0.17 and ad valorem taxes being $1.06 during the study period. These
differences underscore the importance of accounting for the size of the tax rather than simply using
a dummy variable for any tax. In a binary specification, localities with excise and ad valorem taxes
are treated the same, even though the typical excise tax is so small that those localities are
effectively much closer to the comparison group of non-tax adopting localities than to the ad
valorem tax group.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for our sample when aggregated to the locality-byquarter level. This sample includes 1,428 locality-by-quarter observations, of which 186 are
subject to an e-cigarette tax. On average, 3,608 mls of e-cigarette liquid; 80,732 packs of traditional
cigarettes; 5,566 cigars; 5,985 ounces of chewing tobacco; and 712 ounces of loose tobacco are
purchased within each locality-quarter by every 100,000 residents. For e-cigarettes, purchases are
much lower in localities that adopt an e-cigarette tax, and this is true for traditional cigarettes,
cigars and loose tobacco as well (but not for chewing tobacco). These descriptive statistics also
show that through 2017 indoor vaping bans were still fairly rare, with only 14% of locality-quarter
observations covered, while traditional cigarette indoor smoking bans were much more prevalent
(80%).
Figure 1 displays the geographic and dollar variation in our standardized e-cigarette tax
measure at the end of our sample period in the 4th quarter of 2017 (additional details are also
provided in Appendix Table 1). Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, and West Virginia have excise
tax values of between $0.05 to $0.075 per fluid ml and California, Minnesota, Pennsylvania have
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ad valorem tax rates of between 40% to 95%; thus the higher standardized tax values in the ad
valorem tax states reflect the larger magnitude of these taxes.
b. Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
Since the pass-through of taxes to prices in part depends on market concentration, we provide
supportive evidence by calculating the sample Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). We use 100%
of the e-cigarette products identified in the NRSD 9 to calculate a unit-specific HHI for 70 unique
e-cigarette brands 10 in the NRSD between 2011 and 2017. The annual HHI values are 0.294
(2011), 0.357 (2012 and 2013), 0.218 (2014), 0.164 (2015), 0.180 (2016), and 0.188 (2017), and
the HHI over the full time period is 0.251. An HHI value of over 0.25 is classified as a highly
concentrated industry and an HHI value between 0.15 and 0.25 is a moderately concentrated
industry (U.S. Department of Justice 2010), indicating that e-cigarettes were sold by a moderately
to highly concentrated industry during our study timeframe. This finding suggests an imperfect
level of market competition, which is highly relevant to our main results, as imperfect competition
has been theoretically linked to over-shifting of taxes to prices (Besley and Rosen 1999).
c. Estimates of Pass-through of E-Cigarette Taxes
We first present results estimating the effects of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette prices.
Table 3 presents results estimating equation (1), where the unit of analysis is a UPC-localityquarter and the independent variable is e-cigarette price. Moving from left to right in the table, we
begin with a parsimonious specification that only includes e-cigarette taxes, then we add locality
and quarter fixed effects, then we add time-varying controls, then finally we replace the locality

9
Nielsen began to categorize specific UPC codes as e-cigarettes in 2013. We identify e-cigarettes in 2011 and 2012
as those categorized by Nielsen as e-cigarettes in 2013 and after. For our calculation of the HHI we use all ecigarettes categorized by Nielsen rather than the 93.5% matched to additional characteristics.
10
We group obvious brands produced by the same company together. For example, BLU is listed as ‘BLU CIGS,’
‘BLU ECIGS,’ and ‘BLU ECIGS PLUS+’ etc.
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fixed effects with UPC-by-locality fixed effects in the last column. We find that every $1.00
increase in e-cigarette taxes raises e-cigarette prices by over $1.31 in all regressions and over $1.55
in the specifications with fixed effects. These estimates are all statistically significantly different
from zero (and from one) at the 1% level. We therefore find robust evidence that e-cigarette taxes
are over-shifted to consumers. Examining the last two columns, we do not see that changes in
traditional cigarette taxes lead to statistically significant changes in e-cigarette prices, and the point
estimates are small in magnitude.
Our estimated pass-through is in line with previous work on other ‘sin goods,’ which
suggests that taxes are passed through at a higher than 100% level, for example, alcohol, traditional
cigarettes, and sugar-sweetened beverages (Kenkel 2005, Cawley et al. 2019). A number of
possible mechanisms for a higher than 100% pass-through exist within the e-cigarette market. For
example, our HHI calculation suggests a high degree of market concentration, supporting the
notion that the retail-based e-cigarette industry is imperfectly competitive, a market environment
susceptible to over-shifting of taxes to prices. Further, given the wide dispersion of e-cigarette
taxes throughout the country (see Figure 1), the existence of cross-border purchases by consumers
may not be as common in the market for e-cigarettes as in the case of other similar tobacco
products, such as traditional cigarettes.
Next, in order to test the parallel trends assumption of the DD model and to examine
whether there were any anticipatory price increases, we estimate an event study. In particular, we
treat the e-cigarette tax effective quarter as the event and construct 16 quarter leads (i.e.,
interactions between an indicator variable for being a tax adopting states and time-to-event) and
four quarter lags around this event. Periods (quarter-years) more than 16 (four) quarters in advance
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(after) the effective date are included in the -16 (+4) bin. All non-adopting localities are coded as
zero for event-time bins. The omitted category is the period (quarter-year) prior to the event.
Figure 2 shows the results, displaying the dynamics of e-cigarette prices in the quarters
before and after an e-cigarette tax increase. As the event study illustrates, there is no evidence of
a differential trend in e-cigarette prices in adopting and non-adopting localities prior to the tax
increase. In the quarter after the tax increase, the coefficient estimate increases and stabilizes
between 0.4 and 0.5, suggesting that the implementation of an e-cigarette tax (without
consideration of the tax magnitude) raises prices by $0.40 to $0.50, on average. E-cigarette tax
rates vary substantially, so the smaller implementation-based estimates (vs. the effects estimated
using a DD model and the standardized tax variable, see Table 3) are not surprising. In particular,
as we note in Section 1, an attenuation of the tax coefficient estimate when using a simple indictor,
rather than our preferred standardized measure, is what one would expect.
We also test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. Table 4 lists results from a
number of specification tests. We exclude U.S. Census divisions 11 that do not include any localities
with an e-cigarette tax by the end of our study period, exclude time-varying controls, include U.S.
Census division-by-quarter fixed effects, include UPC-by-quarter fixed effects, use different
weighting methodologies, drop Illinois and Maryland (these states have e-cigarette taxes levied
for counties within their borders), examine an alternative strategy for constructing the e-cigarette
tax variable, and estimate models for which we impute missing e-cigarette prices (due to no sales
in that locality-by-quarter) 12 using the last available price. Our results remain broadly stable and
coefficient estimates suggest an over-shifting of e-cigarette taxes to prices in all specifications.

We use the U.S. Census nine division classification.
E-cigarette pries may be missing for three reasons: (1) the product has not yet been introduced into that locality,
(2) the product has been introduced in that locality but not sold in that particular quarter, or (3) the product has been
discontinued in that locality. Observations from scenario (1) are not relevant to pass-through estimates and therefore
11
12
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Next, we further explore whether there is heterogeneity in the estimates between state vs.
local and ad valorem vs. excise tax variation. One potential issue is the geographic overlap between
excise taxes and the levels at which taxes are levied. A second issue is that ad valorem taxes are
standardized to be equated as excise taxes. To address these issues, in the second-to-last panel of
Table 4 we interact the e-cigarette tax with indicators for an excise (vs. ad valorem) tax and a
county-level (vs. state-level) tax. Our results suggest that, once we control for the geographic level
of the tax and the tax level, excise taxes and ad valorem taxes are passed through to prices at similar
rates. This pattern of results suggests there are no differences in pass-through rates due to the
standardization process, although overall pass-through amounts for ad valorem taxes would be
higher on account of the larger size of these taxes. County-level taxes are passed on at lower rates
than state taxes, supporting the hypothesis that tax evasion is more likely for smaller localities.
Finally, in the last panel of Table 4 we control for the tax law enactment period by including
a variable that accounts for the impact of the interval between signing an e-cigarette tax into law
and subsequently implementing it. Results of this investigation are also highly robust.
Next, we systematically drop treatment localities to examine whether any single treated
locality has an outsized impact on our coefficients. These results, shown in Appendix Table 2,
suggest that our results are stable when removing individual treatment localities. Finally, in
Appendix Table 3, we aggregate the data to the locality-by-quarter level to examine pass-through
at a higher level of aggregation that does not hold constant product availability/quality. This
specification also allows us to examine whether e-cigarette taxes lead to changes in e-cigarette
products and/or characteristics. To this end, we examine whether e-cigarette taxes are related to

are appropriately not included in the analysis. Observations from (2) and (3) could be important in estimating passthrough if the tax passes through at such a high rate that it causes products to not be purchased in that quarter
(scenario 2), or ever again (scenario 3). Our results are virtually unchanged when using the last available price, thus
helping to alleviate these concerns.
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the number of new e-cigarette products in each quarter and locality and whether they are related
to the average ounces of liquid per unit sold. In this case, we find a somewhat smaller pass-through
estimate ($1.107), but the 95% confidence interval includes our estimate from Table 3. We do not
find that e-cigarette taxes led to changes in the number of e-cigarette products sold for the first
time in a given locality or in the liquid per unit sold, suggesting that manufacturers are not changing
their offering of products in response to the taxes.
d. Estimates of Effects of E-Cigarette Taxes on Tobacco Product Sales
Next, we examine the effects of e-cigarette and traditional cigarette prices on the sales of
e-cigarettes and other tobacco products. For these analyses, we examine sales at the locality-byquarter level with equation (3), an IV regression where we instrument for e-cigarette prices and
traditional cigarette prices with e-cigarette taxes and traditional cigarette taxes. Relative to the
reduced form models estimated thus far, these IV analyses require the additional assumption that
taxes only influence sales via prices (i.e., the exclusion restriction). We cannot rule out the
possibility that taxes could exert part of their influence through mechanisms besides prices, such
as signaling about health risks, in which case the IV estimates could be overstated.
Table 5 shows the results of these models across five tobacco products: e-cigarettes,
traditional cigarettes, cigars, chewing tobacco, and loose tobacco. In the first column, every $1.00
increase in e-cigarette prices reduces e-cigarette sales by 1,255 ml of liquid, statistically significant
at the 1% level. The e-cigarette results provide an estimated price elasticity of demand for ecigarettes of -2.6. 13 This estimate suggests that a 10% increase in e-cigarette prices leads to a 26%
decrease in e-cigarette sales. Note that, since the magnitude of the estimate is far greater than one,

We multiply the coefficient from Table 5 by the average pre-tax e-cigarette price (5.03 from Appendix Table 3)
and divide by average pre-tax e-cigarette sales (2,425 from Table 5): -1,255* (5.03/2,425) = -2.6.
13
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we consider it unlikely that our finding that e-cigarettes are price elastic can be attributed to the
potential presence of small secondary mechanisms noted above.
We also find that e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes are economic substitutes, evident
in the positive and statistically significant effect of e-cigarette prices on traditional cigarette sales
(and vice versa). In particular, a 1% increase in the price of traditional cigarettes increases ecigarette sales by 1.19% while a 1% increase in the price of e-cigarettes increases traditional
cigarette sales by 0.97%. 14 We estimate a traditional cigarette own price elasticity of -0.63, which
is in line with many previous estimates of the price elasticity of demand for traditional cigarettes. 15
We do not find any statistically or economically significant effects of e-cigarette price changes or
traditional cigarette price changes on the sales of the other categories of tobacco products.
Comparable elasticities can be computed using back-of-the-envelope calculations based on
reduced-form regressions of the sales of tobacco products on cigarette and e-cigarette taxes using
equation (2). Appendix Table 4 shows results from these specifications. We find that every $1.00
increase in e-cigarette taxes reduces e-cigarette sales by -1,486 ml and increases traditional
cigarette sales by 13,361 cigarettes. These coefficient estimates translate into own and cross-price
elasticities of -2.78 and 1.02, respectively, which are very similar to the own and cross-price
elasticities we estimate in Table 5. The own and cross-price elasticities estimated from traditional
cigarette taxes are -0.65 and 1.24, which are again very similar to the elasticities calculated in
Table 5.

Here, we take the traditional cigarette price coefficient from the first column of Table 5 multiplied by the average
cigarette price, pre-tax (5.37 from Appendix Table 3) and divide by the average e-cigarette sales pre-tax (2,425 from
Table 5). 538*(5.37/2,425) = 1.19. The second number is calculated in a similar way, except we use the average ecigarette price, pre-tax (5.37 from Appendix Table 3) and the average traditional cigarette sales pre-tax (59,798 from
Table 5). Thus, 11,489*(5.03/59,798) = 0.97.
15
Here, -7,057*(5.37/59,798) = -0.63.
14
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Next, we re-estimate our IV model in equation (3) systematically dropping treatment
localities to examine whether any single treated locality has an outsized impact on our coefficient
estimates. These results shown in Appendix Table 5 suggest that our results are stable when
removing individual treatment localities. 16
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effects of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette prices, purchases,
and other tobacco-related outcomes. We use UPC-level data on retail sales of e-cigarettes and other
tobacco products from the NRSD. Importantly, we link the vast majority of e-cigarette UPCs
(93.5%) in the NRSD to supplemental product characteristics collected by our research team,
including the liquid amount, nicotine levels, and product types.
We find that e-cigarette taxes are passed through to e-cigarette prices at more than a 100%
rate, consistent with our HHI calculation suggesting moderate to high market concentration. Our
estimate of over pass-through is also similar to an estimate from the literature for the state of
Minnesota (Saffer et al. 2019). We also provide the first estimates of e-cigarette market
concentration, calculating an HHI of 0.25, which indicates a moderately to highly concentrated
market as classified by the U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice 2010). We also
find that e-cigarettes are an elastic good, with an estimated price elasticity of demand of -2.6. We
estimate that e-cigarettes and traditional cigarettes are economic substitutes, as e-cigarette sales
increase with traditional cigarette tax increases and traditional cigarette sales increase with ecigarette tax increases.

According to NRSD documentation and our conversation with data administrators, in 2017 the composition of
stores tracked within the NRSD shifted from grocery stores to dollar stores and club stores. We also explore the
sensitivity of our estimates to dropping 2017 data that incorporated this compositional shift. Point estimates
remained of the same sign and were not statistically different from estimates using 2017 data.

16
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A limitation of our study is the reliance on e-cigarettes sold through retail stores, ignoring
e-cigarettes sold through specialty vape shops and online. Additionally, the NRSD does not include
a large percent of sales from convenience and liquor stores. However, this limitation is balanced
by the ability to observe UPC-level purchases in the NRSD. As more survey data on e-cigarette
use become available, an important area of future research will be to examine how pass-through
and elasticity results using self-reported datasets compare with results using scanner data.
Between the end of our study period in 2017 and June 15, 2019, eight additional states have
enacted new e-cigarette laws (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Vermont, and Washington) (Public Health Law Center 2019). In late October, 2019, the
United States House Ways and Means Committee approved an e-cigarette tax with bipartisan
support that set a national e-cigarette tax proportional to the federal traditional cigarette tax
(Bloomberg News 2019). Additionally, in 2019 eight states have imposed temporary bans on the
sale of all e-cigarettes or flavored e-cigarettes (Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids 2019a), which is
equivalent to an infinite price increase for the banned products, absent likely black market activity.
Our study suggests that, as intended, e-cigarette taxes raise e-cigarette prices and reduce ecigarette sales. However, an unintended effect is an increase in cigarette sales. The current House
bill specifies a tax rate of $50.33 per 1,810 milligrams of nicotine (or $0.028 per milligram). Juul
pods today contain 59 milligrams/ml (at 5% nicotine volume). Assuming this conversion, we
simulate that if this bill were to become law, the tax would raise e-cigarette prices by $2.54 per ml
($0.0278 x 59 x 1.55 from Table 3). This price increase would reduce e-cigarette purchases by
3,188 ml per 100,000 adults ($2.54 x 1,255 from Table 5), but would increase traditional cigarette
purchases by 29,182 packs per 100,000 adults ($2.54 x 11,489 from Table 5). Therefore, a national
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e-cigarette tax will increase traditional cigarettes purchased by 6.2 extra packs for every one
standard e-cigarette pod of 0.7 ml no longer purchased.
Although vaping-related illnesses are a public health concern, traditional cigarettes
continue to kill nearly 480,000 Americans each year (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2019a), and several reviews support the conclusion that e-cigarettes contain fewer toxicants
(National Academies of Sciences Engineering and Medicine 2018, Royal College of Physicians
2019) and are safer for non-pregnant adults (Royal College of Physicians 2019) than traditional
cigarettes. Thus, balancing e-cigarette and traditional cigarette use will continue to be an important
issue for policymakers to consider as they develop e-cigarette related tobacco control policies.
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Appendix: Standardizing the E-cigarette Taxes
E-cigarette taxes have been levied using either specific excise taxes or ad valorem taxes through
2017. Kansas, Louisiana, North Carolina, West Virginia, Cook County, and Chicago use an
excise tax on liquid volume. California, Minnesota, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and
Washington DC use an ad valorem tax. Chicago uses an excise tax on both liquid volume and the
number of disposable or refill units sold. Several Alaskan counties also have e-cigarette taxes,
but Alaska is not included in the NRSD and is therefore not included in our standardization
exercise. Between the end of our study period in 2017 and June 15, 2019, eight additional states
enacted new e-cigarette laws (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Vermont, and Washington).
Ad Valorem Tax: Washington DC’s ad valorem tax is conveniently benchmarked to be 100% of
the cigarette excise tax, suggesting that each one percentage point of ad valorem tax had a value
of approximately $0.043. We multiply this value by the ratio of sales volume in units to sales
volume in ml of fluid (calculated for each tax jurisdiction s on a year-by-quarter basis t) to obtain
a measure of tax per ml of fluid.
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∗ 0.043 ∗

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
=
= 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

One concern with our equation is that the ratio of sales volume in units to ml of fluid may be
endogenous to the e-cigarette tax adoption. Therefore, our primary standardized tax measure uses
the ratio for all locations that have not adopted e-cigarette taxes by January 2020. As a sensitivity
analysis, we use the ratio specific to each jurisdiction. Results are similar regardless of which
measure is used.
For Cook County, we do not have the ability to separate Chicago from the rest of Cook County
in the Nielsen data. For the Chicago portion of the tax, Chicago uses a $0.55 tax per ml of fluid
and a $0.80 tax per ‘container’ of products containing liquid nicotine (e.g., cartridge, disposable,
bottle of liquid nicotine). We, therefore, calculated tax per ml of fluid in the following way:
0.55 +

𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
∗ 0.80 = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠

For the Cook County tax, similar to the approach mentioned earlier to address potential concerns
of endogeneity, we used the ratio of sales volume in containers to sale volume in ml of fluid for
all locations that have not adopted e-cigarette taxes by January 2020 for our primary
standardized e-cigarette tax measure. As a sensitivity analysis, we use the ratio specific to
Chicago. Results are similar regardless of which measure is used.
Since Chicago makes up approximately 52.1% of the population of Cook County in 2017, we
weighted the Chicago tax by this share of the population to approximate the Cook County tax.
Cook County later passed its own tax per fluid ml of fluid that we added in whole to the
weighted tax from Chicago.
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Figure 1. Map of e-Cigarette taxes per ml of vaping liquid in 4Q 2017
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Figure 2. Effect of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette prices using an event study: Nielsen retail sales UPC-level
data 2011-2017

Quarters to adoption
Notes: The unit of observation is a UPC-code in a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter-by-year). The model
estimated by equation (1) except using lags and leads from the first available e-cigarette tax in a given locality. The
model is estimated with least squares and controls for time-varying locality characteristics, UPC-by-locality fixed
effects, and period (quarter-by-year) fixed effects. Circles reflect the beta coefficient estimate and vertical solid lines
reflect 95% confidence intervals. The omitted category is the quarter prior to policy adoption.
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Table 1. Summary statistics: Nielsen retail sales UPC-level data 2011-2017
All
Localities that adopt a
Localities that do not
Sample:
localities
tax by 2017, pre-tax
adopt a tax by 2017
Prices
E-cigarette ($ per ML)
4.40
4.49
4.34
E-cigarette taxes
E-cigarette standardized tax
0.044
--($)
Conditional e-cigarette
0.68
--standardized tax ($)
Conditional e-cigarette
0.17
--standardized tax ($) - ad
valorem
Conditional e-cigarette
1.06
--standardized tax ($) - excise
Policies and Demographics
Traditional cigarette tax ($)
1.57
1.19
1.60
% covered by indoor vaping
0.14
0.086
0.13
ban
% covered by indoor
0.81
0.86
0.79
smoking ban
Tobacco 21 law
0.01
0.02
0.00
Beer tax ($)
0.26
0.19
0.28
ACA Medicaid expansion
0.34
0.28
0.33
Unemployment rate
6.00
7.14
5.91
Age
38.4
38.1
38.4
Male
0.49
0.48
0.49
Female
0.51
0.52
0.51
White
0.80
0.76
0.82
African American
0.12
0.16
0.11
Other race
0.08
0.08
0.08
Hispanic
0.11
0.12
0.12
Born outside the U.S.
0.10
0.12
0.10
Less than high school
0.15
0.16
0.15
High school
0.29
0.29
0.29
Some college
0.27
0.25
0.28
College
0.28
0.29
0.28
Population (millions)
6.43
10.2
5.85
Observations
90730
10248
73693
Notes: The unit of observation is a UPC-code in a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter-by-year). Data are
weighted by the share of e-cigarette sales in localities that do not adopt an e-cigarette tax.
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Table 2. Summary statistics: Nielsen retail sales locality-level data 2011-2017
All
Localities that adopt a
Localities that do not
Sample:
localities
tax by 2017, pre-tax
adopt a tax by 2017
Sales per 100,000 state adult residents
E-cigarette (ML)
3,608
2,425
3,962
Tobacco cigarette (packs)
80,732
59,798
88,508
Cigar (units)
5,566
3,425
6,119
Chewing tobacco (ounces)
5,985
6,132
5,894
Loose tobacco (ounces)
712
598
723
E-cigarette taxes
E-cigarette standardized
0.047
--tax ($)
Conditional e-cigarette
0.73
.
.
standardized tax ($)
Conditional e-cigarette
0.16
.
.
standardized tax ($) - ad
valorem
Conditional e-cigarette
1.06
.
.
standardized tax ($) excise
Policies and
Demographics
Traditional cigarette tax
1.64
1.04
1.77
($)
% covered by indoor
0.14
0.14
0.12
vaping ban
% covered by indoor
0.80
0.86
0.77
smoking ban
Tobacco 21 law
0.03
0.07
0
Beer tax ($)
0.26
0.19
0.28
ACA Medicaid expansion
0.34
0.37
0.30
Unemployment rate
6.45
7.74
6.24
Age
38.2
37.6
38.3
Male
0.49
0.49
0.49
Female
0.51
0.51
0.51
White
0.78
0.76
0.79
African American
0.13
0.11
0.13
Other race
0.09
0.13
0.08
Hispanic
0.17
0.24
0.16
Born outside the U.S.
0.14
0.19
0.13
Less than high school
0.16
0.18
0.16
High school
0.28
0.27
0.29
Some college
0.27
0.27
0.27
College
0.28
0.28
0.28
Population (millions)
14.0
24.9
11.0
Observations
1428
186
1148
Notes: The unit of observation is a locality (state or county) in a period (quarter-by-year). Data are weighted by the
locality population.
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Table 3. Effect of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette prices using a two-way fixed effects model: Nielsen retail
sales UPC-level data 2011-2017
Outcome:
E-cigarette price ($)
Mean in e-cigarette tax
4.49
4.49
4.49
4.49
adopting localities, pre-tax┼
E-cigarette standardized
1.314***
1.573***
1.568***
1.554***
tax ($)
[1.103,1.525]
[1.158,1.988]
[1.206,1.931]
[1.322,1.786]
Traditional cigarette tax
--0.025
0.052
per pack ($)
[-0.142,0.191]
[-0.196,0.300]
Locality fixed effects
N
Y
Y
n/a
Period (quarter-by-year)
N
Y
Y
Y
fixed effects
Time-varying controls
N
N
Y
Y
UPC-by-locality fixed effects
N
N
N
Y
Observations
90730
90730
90730
90730
Notes: The unit of observation is a UPC-code in a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter-by-year). All
models estimated with least squares. Data are weighted by the share of e-cigarette sales in localities that do not
adopt an e-cigarette tax. 95% confidence intervals that account for within-locality clustering are reported in square
brackets. ***,**, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 4. Effect of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette prices using a two-way fixed effects model, alternative
specifications and samples: Nielsen retail sales UPC-level data 2011-2017
Outcome:
E-cigarette price ($)
Mean in e-cigarette tax adopting localities, pre-tax┼
4.49
Exclude divisions with no adopting localities by 2017 (New England, East South Central, and Mountain)
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.483***
[1.280,1.686]
Observations
59475
Exclude time-varying locality-level controls
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.667***
[1.319,2.016]
Observations
90730
Include division-by-quarter fixed effects
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.589***
[1.383,1.795]
Observations
90730
Include UPC-by-quarter fixed effects
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.653***
[1.265,2.041]
Observations
90730
Unweighted
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.575***
[1.244,1.907]
Observations
90730
Weight by population
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.445***
[1.221,1.668]
Observations
90730
Weight by quarterly e-cigarette sales in 2013
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.334***
[1.091,1.578]
Observations
90730
Drop Illinois and Maryland (localities with sub-state taxes)
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.701***
[1.492,1.909]
Observations
84247
Population-weighted e-cigarette tax for Illinois and Maryland (localities with sub-state taxes)
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.681***
[1.473,1.890]
Observations
90730
Use alternative e-cigarette tax variable1
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.284***
[0.827,1.740]
Observations
90730
Impute missing e-cigarette prices2
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.489***
[1.299,1.680]
Observations
116018
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Table 4. (continued)
Interact e-cigarette tax with indicators for an excise (vs. ad valorem) tax and a county-level (vs. state-level)
tax
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.683***
[1.469,1.896]
E-cigarette standardized tax ($) * excise tax
0.131
[-0.374,0.636]
E-cigarette standardized tax ($) * county-level tax
-0.698***
[-1.154,-0.243]
Observations
90730
Control for the enactment period
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.540***
[1.285,1.795]
Enactment period
-0.050
[-0.255,0.156]
Observations
90730
Notes: The unit of observation is a UPC-code in a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter-by-year). All
models estimated with least squares and control for time-varying locality characteristics, UPC-by-locality fixed
effects, and period (quarter-by-year) fixed effects unless otherwise noted. Data are weighted by the share of ecigarette sales in localities that do not adopt an e-cigarette tax unless otherwise noted. 95% confidence intervals that
account for within-locality clustering are reported in square brackets. ┼Mean values are based on the full sample of
e-cigarette adopting localities, pre-tax. ***,**, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level.
1
See the appendix for additional details.
2
For localities with zero sales for a given UPC code (and hence no available prices), we forward impute with the last
available price if a sale had previously been made for that UPC in that locality.
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Table 5. Effect of e-cigarette prices on sales per 100,000 adults simultaneously instrumenting e-cigarette and
traditional cigarette prices with e-cigarette and traditional cigarette taxes: Neilson state-level sales data 20112017
Traditional
Chewing
Loose
Outcome:
E-cigarettes
cigarettes
Cigars
tobacco
tobacco
Mean sales in
2,425
59,798
3,425
6,132
598
adopting
localities, pre
adoption
E-cigarette price
-1,255***
11,489***
-651
105
-194
($)
[-2,133,-377]
[3,322,19,657]
[-2,039,736]
[-1,369,1,580]
[-526,137]
Traditional
538*
-7,057**
609
-92
112
cigarette price ($)
[-72,1,149]
[-12,622,-1,492]
[-362,1,581]
[-981,798]
[-74,298]
Observations
1428
1428
1428
1428
1428
Notes: All models estimated with two-stage least squares and control for time-varying area characteristics, area
fixed effects, and period (quarter-by-year) fixed effects. 1st stage F-statistics are 14.95 for e-cigarette prices and
408.74 for traditional cigarette prices. 95% confidence intervals that account for within-state clustering are reported
in square brackets. ***,**, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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APPENDIX TABLES

Appendix Table 1. E-cigarette tax adoption through the end of 2017
Effective
Unit
Tax
Tax value Q4
Locality
date
taxed
amount
2017 ($)
State
California
4/2017, 7/2017
Wholesale price
27.3%, 65.1%
1.272
District of Columbia
10/2015, 10/2016
Wholesale price
67%, 65%
1.272
Kansas
1/2017, 7/2017
Per fluid milliliter
$0.20, $0.05
0.050
Louisiana
7/2015
Per fluid milliliter
$0.05
0.050
Minnesota
8/2010, 7/2013
Wholesale price
35%, 95%
1.849
North Carolina
6/2015
Per fluid milliliter
$0.05
0.050
Pennsylvania
7/2016
Wholesale price
40%
0.775
West Virginia
7/2016
Per fluid milliliter
$0.075
0.075
County/City
Chicago, Illinois
1/2016
Per unit / per fluid
$0.80 / $0.55
0.606^
milliliter
Cook County, Illinois
5/2016
Per fluid milliliter
$0.20
0.606^
Montgomery County,
8/2015
Wholesale price
30%
0.586
Maryland
Notes: See text for full details. Minnesota is a treated control for our study period. ^ The Chicago tax is added to the
Cook County tax based on the share of the population residing in Chicago, see the appendix for further details.
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Appendix Table 2. Effect of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette prices using a two-way fixed effects model
excluding treated localities one at a time: Nielsen retail sales UPC-level data 2011-2017
Outcome:
E-cigarette price ($)
Mean in e-cigarette tax adopting localities, pre-tax┼
4.49
Exclude California
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.540***
[1.278,1.803]
Observations
88559
Exclude Cook County, IL
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.614***
[1.383,1.846]
Observations
89182
Exclude DC
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.478***
[1.149,1.807]
Observations
89651
Exclude Kansas
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.560***
[1.328,1.793]
Observations
89155
Exclude Louisiana
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.544***
[1.314,1.773]
Observations
88729
Exclude Minnesota
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.457***
[1.246,1.669]
Observations
89263
Exclude Montgomery County, MD
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.624***
[1.400,1.847]
Observations
89467
Exclude North Carolina
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.555***
[1.323,1.788]
Observations
88656
Exclude Pennsylvania
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.601***
[1.346,1.857]
Observations
88667
Exclude West Virginia
E-cigarette standardized tax ($)
1.550***
[1.318,1.781]
Observations
88934
Notes: The unit of observation is a UPC-code in a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter/year). All models
estimated with least squares and control for time-varying locality characteristics, UPC-by-locality fixed effects, and
period (quarter-by-year) fixed effects. Data are weighted by the share of e-cigarette sales in localities that do not
adopt an e-cigarette tax. 95% confidence intervals that account for within-locality clustering are reported in square
brackets. ┼Mean values are based on the full sample of e-cigarette adopting localities, pre-tax. ***,**, and * =
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Appendix Table 3. Effect of e-cigarette and traditional cigarette taxes on the prices, number of new ecigarette products, and liquid per unit using a two-way fixed effects model: Nielsen retail sales state-level data
2011-2017
Number of new
Traditional
E-cigarette
e-cigarette
Liquid
Outcome:
cigarette price ($)
price ($)
products
per unit
Mean in e-cigarette tax
5.37
5.03
14.3
1.47
adopting localities, pretax
E-cigarette standardized
0.123
1.107**
-2.016
0.029
tax ($)
[-0.062,0.309]
[0.248,1.966]
[-5.084,1.052]
[-0.216,0.273]
Traditional cigarette tax
1.064***
-0.059
-0.259
0.061
per pack ($)
[0.961,1.168]
[-0.470,0.353]
[-1.381,0.864]
[-0.109,0.231]
Observations
1428
1428
1428
1428
Notes: The unit of observation is a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter/year). All models estimated with
least squares and control for time-varying locality characteristics, locality fixed effects, and period (quarter-by-year)
fixed effects. Data are weighted by the average quarterly traditional cigarette sales in 2011 in the traditional cigarette
pass-through regression; by the average quarterly e-cigarette sales in 2013 in the e-cigarette pass-through regression;
and the average quarterly e-cigarette sales in 2013 for the new product and liquid per unit regressions. 95%
confidence intervals that account for within-locality clustering are reported in square brackets. ***,**, and * =
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Appendix Table 4. Effect of e-cigarette taxes on e-cigarette and tobacco product sales per 100,000 state adult
residents using a two-way fixed effects model: Nielsen retail sales locality-level data 2011-2017
Traditional
Chewing
Loose
Outcome:
E-cigarettes
cigarettes
Cigars
tobacco
tobacco
Mean in e-cigarette
2,425
59,798
3,425
6,132
598
tax adopting
localities, pre-tax
E-cigarette
-1,486***
13,361**
-734
119
-227
standardized tax ($)
[-2,307,-666]
[3,324,23,398]
[-2,338,871]
[-1,783,2,022]
[-597,144]
Traditional cigarette
595**
-7,724*
662
-100
123
tax per pack ($)
[132,1,058]
[-15,568,121]
[-406,1,731]
[-1,146,946]
[-92,338]
Observations
1428
1428
1428
1428
1428
Notes: The unit of observation is a locality (state or county) in a quarter (quarter-by-year). All models estimated with
least squares and control for time-varying locality characteristics, locality fixed effects, and period (quarter-by-year)
fixed effects. Data are weighted by the locality population. 95% confidence intervals that account for within-locality
clustering are reported in square brackets. ***,**, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level.
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Appendix Table 5. Effect of e-cigarette prices on sales per 100,000 adults instrumenting the e-cigarette price
with the e-cigarette tax and instrumenting the traditional cigarette price with the traditional cigarette tax
(leave one out analysis): Neilson state-level sales data 2011-2017
Traditional
Chew
Loose
Outcome:
E-cigarettes
cigarettes
Cigars
tobacco
tobacco
Mean sales in
2,425
59,798
3,425
6,132
598
adopting
localities, pre
adoption┼
Exclude
California
E-cigarette price
-1,881***
14,263***
-895
-762
-320
($)
[-3,216,-547]
[3,834,24,693]
[-2,872,1,082]
[-3,041,1,517]
[-828,188]
Traditional
185
-9,029***
426
-508
94
cigarette price ($)
[-572,941]
[-14,457,-3,601]
[-675,1,528]
[-1,657,642]
[-120,308]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude Cook
Co, IL
E-cigarette price
-965***
9,834***
-647
-52
-109
($)
[-1,515,-415]
[3,130,16,539]
[-2,032,737]
[-1,488,1,384]
[-372,154]
Traditional
346
-6,501**
721
-25
90
cigarette price ($)
[-164,857]
[-12,234,-768]
[-292,1,734]
[-962,913]
[-95,275]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude DC
E-cigarette price
-1,211***
10,967***
-568
24
-183
($)
[-2,063,-359]
[2,748,19,185]
[-1,944,809]
[-1,504,1,551]
[-512,146]
Traditional
516*
-6,804**
572
-62
107
cigarette price ($)
[-92,1,124]
[-12,484,-1,123]
[-392,1,537]
[-970,845]
[-78,292]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude Kansas
E-cigarette price
-1,287***
10,478***
-701
138
-203
($)
[-2,166,-408]
[2,663,18,294]
[-2,117,715]
[-1,329,1,605]
[-541,135]
Traditional
563*
-6,261**
648
-114
119
cigarette price ($)
[-69,1,194]
[-11,538,-984]
[-346,1,641]
[-1,008,779]
[-71,309]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude
Louisiana
E-cigarette price
-1,333***
12,627***
-312
-15
-182
($)
[-2,277,-390]
[3,908,21,345]
[-1,468,844]
[-1,642,1,612]
[-539,174]
Traditional
595*
-7,903***
370
-9
105
cigarette price ($)
[-61,1,251]
[-13,704,-2,103]
[-451,1,191]
[-951,933]
[-96,306]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude
Minnesota
E-cigarette price
-1,036**
12,412**
-753
401
-216
($)
[-1,981,-91]
[2,904,21,921]
[-2,346,841]
[-1,272,2,074]
[-632,199]
Traditional
704***
-7,522**
674
-66
122
cigarette price ($)
[194,1,215]
[-13,711,-1,332]
[-450,1,799]
[-1,022,889]
[-95,338]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude
Montgomery
Co, MD
E-cigarette price
-1,269***
10,841***
-674
162
-248
($)
[-2,143,-395]
[2,703,18,978]
[-2,090,741]
[-1,323,1,647]
[-589,93]
Traditional
544*
-6,714**
623
-122
141
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cigarette price ($)
[-82,1,170]
[-12,423,-1,004]
[-367,1,614]
[-1,041,798]
[-52,333]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude North
Carolina
E-cigarette price
-1,280***
12,030***
-680
407
-211
($)
[-2,161,-400]
[3,526,20,535]
[-2,058,698]
[-632,1,446]
[-537,116]
Traditional
540*
-6,977**
621
-98
116
cigarette price ($)
[-74,1,153]
[-12,620,-1,334]
[-349,1,590]
[-872,675]
[-72,303]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude
Pennsylvania
E-cigarette price
-1,161**
12,654***
-587
378
-144
($)
[-2,173,-150]
[3,792,21,517]
[-1,900,726]
[-1,203,1,960]
[-480,192]
Traditional
520*
-7,254**
604
-159
102
cigarette price ($)
[-64,1,104]
[-12,919,-1,589]
[-358,1,566]
[-1,040,721]
[-89,292]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Exclude West
Virginia
E-cigarette price
-1,266***
11,313***
-648
-6
-149
($)
[-2,158,-374]
[2,955,19,671]
[-2,060,764]
[-1,546,1,534]
[-458,160]
Traditional
549*
-6,889**
618
-23
81
cigarette price ($)
[-68,1,166]
[-12,522,-1,257]
[-369,1,605]
[-929,883]
[-91,253]
Observations
1400
1400
1400
1400
1400
Notes: All models estimated with two-stage least squares and control for time-varying locality characteristics,
locality fixed effects, and period (quarter-by-year) fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals that account for withinlocality clustering are reported in square brackets. ┼Mean values are based on the full sample of e-cigarette adopting
localities, pre-tax. ***, **, and * = statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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